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ABSTRACT 
Human rights are protected under international human rights law. In exceptional cases, 
such as a concern of the community of nations, states are allowed to temporarily suspend 
from some of their treaty obligations. Such exceptional circumstances, provided for in 
derogation provisions, are established in treaties such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms and the American Convention on Human Rights. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights does not contain such exceptional provisions. This paper 
aims at analysing the lack of a derogation clause from the African Charter. 
Through secondary modes of data collection, which mainly includes of books, journal 
articles and decided cases, this paper seeks to assess the scope of the doctrine of deroga-
tion from international and regional human rights instruments. By doing so, the practica-
bility of the derogation clause will be examined. Further undertakings of this study will 
be to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of including a derogation clause in the 
African Charter, as well as highlighting the practice of derogation in some African states. 
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Derogation clauses allowing states to temporarily suspend from some of their treaty obli-
gations during times of public emergency, 1 are established in several human rights in-
struments. The clause is justified by the acknowledgment that sovereign states have the 
responsibility to protect their citizens and their domestic institutions. 2 Unlike all other 
human rights treaties which include the (European) Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 3 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR)4 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),5 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) contains no such clause. In 
the Commission nationale des droits de l 'Homme et des libertes v. Chad the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACmHPR) held that the Charter ' does not 
allow for state parties to derogate from their treaty obligation'. 6 The African Commission 
reaffirmed the latter, by also holding that 'the limitations on the rights and freedoms en-
shrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies and special circumstances' . 7 
Hence the question then, is why the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Un-
ion), in drafting the African Charter, would intentionally omit the clause, keeping in 
1 Lehmann J, 'Limits to counter-terrorism: Comparing derogation from the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights ' 8 Essex Human Rights Review, 
(2011) , 104. 
Alnouq M, ' Derogation, emergency and the rule of law: Scope and limitations ' Unpublished LLM Thesis, 
Central European University, 20 I 0, 7. 
2 Cowell F, ' Sovereignty and the question of derogation: An analysis of Article 15 of the ECHR and the 
absence of a derogation clause in the ACHPR ' I Birkbeck Lmv Review (20 13 ), 136. 
3 Article 15 , ECHR, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
4 Article 4 , ICCPR , 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
5 Article 27, ACHR, 22 November 1969, Treaty Series No. 36. 
6 Commission Nationale des Droits de !'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad, ACmHPR Comm. 74/92, 9 Activi-
ty Report (1995), 21. 
7 Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, ACmHPR Comm. I 05/93 , 128/94, 
130/94, 152/96, 14 Activity Report (2000), 41. 
mind, its continued influence in the recognised international human rights sphere. For in-
stance, it is common international practice that, the limitation clause is deemed insuffi-
cient when extraordinary circumstances arise. Therefore, it is evident that confrontation 
arises, as to whether a derogation clause is suitable in the Charter. Because the absence, 
for one, has been depicted as a positive development of human rights norms in Africa and 
should not be seen as a defect, 8 while on the other hand, it has been criticised for allowing 
discretionary abuse by states through the African Charter's 'clawback clauses' with others 
even going as far as recommending state parties to ignore the Charter in times of public 
and state emergencies.9 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
Emergencies are certain to occur during the lifetime of any community. 10 Situations of 
war and emergency have unfortunately been frequent in the recent history of the African 
continent. 11 The African Charter should presumably effect a derogation clause so as to 
protect states faced with emergencies while ensuring clear rules for the protection of the 
rights of individuals. The African Charter however, does not provide for a derogation 
clause, thus seemingly defeating its own obligation to promote and protect the rights of 
individuals and peoples'. 12 
1.3 Hypothesis 
Due to the almost unanimous use of a derogation clause in international human rights 
law, and its acceptance in African states through their constitutions, the derogation clause 
is most appropriate in the context of the African Charter. 
~ Ali A, 'Derogation from constitutional rights and its implication under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights ' 17 Law, Democracy & Development Journal of Faculty of Law (20 13), 79. 
9 Heyns C, 'The African reg ional human rights system: In need of reform?' l Afi'ican Human Rights Law 
Journal (200 l ), 162. 
10 Oren G, 'Once more unto the breach: The systemic failure of applying the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights to entrenched emergencies ' 23 Yale Journal of International Law (1998), 438. 
11 D' Sa RM, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights : Problems and prospects for regional 
action ' 10 Australian Yearbook of International Law ( 1983), l 09 as cited in Brems E, Human Rights: Uni-
versality and diversity , Kluwer Law International , The Hague, 200 l , 125. 
12 Preamble para. 10, ACHPR, 27 June 1981 , 1520 UNTS 217. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
The dissertation has the following objectives: 
1. To analyse the history of the derogation clause and its international impact. 
11. To evaluate the various constitutional provisions that already provide for some form of 
derogation in various African states. 
iii. To investigate the suitability of the derogation clause in the African Charter. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The main question of the research is, 'Is the principle of a derogation clause appropriate 
in the African Charter so as for the Charter to formally recognise and apply it? In order to 
arrive at the answer, the research also considers these subsidiary questions: 
1. What are the conceptual underpirmings of the derogation clause? 
11. How has the derogation clause been indirectly implemented in African states, despite 
of its absence in the African Charter? 
iii. Is the absence of the clause detrimental to the African Charter or a 'blessing in dis-
guise'? 
iv. How can a derogation clause be applied in the context of the African Charter? 
1.6 Justification of the Study 
Conventions pertaining to human rights have been critiqued by some countries to be in-
struments that interfere with matters, which fall within domestic jurisdiction of States' 
and being an infringement on national sovereignty. 13 With that said, the relative state in-
stability prevalent in Africa over the past two decades, with countries like Sierra Leone, 
Guinea, Liberia, Gambia and Ethiopia declaring state of emergencies in 2010, 2014, 
2014, 2016 and 2018 respectively, it would be reasonable for the Charter to address itself 
from the exceptions to and derogation from the rights of individuals and the circumstanc-
es in which their suspension may be permissible. 14 The study is thus significant in that it 
investigates the relevance of the clause itself, in consideration of the promotion of human 
rights and the necessary part it would or should play in the African Charter. 
13 D'Sa RM, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ', I 07. 
14 D'Sa RM, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights', 107. 
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1.7 Literature Review 
Since the establishment of the African Charter, significant contributions concerning the 
lack of a derogation doctrine have been conducted. Firstly, Laurent Sermet highlights the 
reality that numerous African constitutions, 15 contain derogation clauses within their mu-
nicipal laws, that become operational in cases of exceptional circumstances and crisis 
war. He argues that a common African constitutional standard is not reflected in the Afri-
can Charter, 16 resulting in the African Charter being at odds with domestic constitutional 
law. 17 It is also of less clarity that the African Charter imposes obligations on states to 
make laws in line with the intents and purposes of the Charter. 18 
Further criticism asserts that the absence of the derogation clause, weakens the entire sys-
tem of the African Charter, as states facing an emergency are unlikely to seek the guid-
ance of the ACHPR ifthey know that the recognition and accommodation of their need to 
enter into a state of exception, cannot be appreciated. 19 This is because the response of a 
state to a public emergency is said to be an acid test of its commitment to the effective 
implementation of human rights;20 therefore, the better way to defend fundamental rights 
and the integrity of the law is through constitutional systems that allow for an additional 
15 Section 45(2), Constitution of Nigeria ( 1999). Article 93( 4), Constitution of Ethiopia ( 1995). Article 52, 
Constitution o}Angola ( 1992). Article 46, Constitution of Cape Verde ( 1992). Article 31, Constitution of 
Guinea-Bissau ( 1984). Article 72, Constitution of Mozambique (2004). Article 27(5)(a), Constitution of 
Eritrea ( 1997). Article 24(3), Constitution ofNamibia ( 1990). Article 137, Constitution of Rwanda (2003) . 
Section 38, Constitution of Swaziland (2005). Article 44, Constitution of Uganda ( 1995). Constitution of 
Kenya (20 10). 
16 Sermet L, 'The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
A critical discussion' I African Human Rights Lmv Journal (2007), 144. 
17 Sermet L, ' The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights', 
144. 
18 Tanganyika Law Society and The Legal and Human Rights Centre v. The United Republic of Tanzania, 
AfCHPR App. 009111,011/11 ,2 (2013), para. 101. 
19Cowell F, ' Sovereignty and the question of derogation', 139. 
20 McGoldrick D, 'The interface between public emergency powers and international law' 2 International 
Joumal of Constitutional Law (2004), 388. 
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legal emergency act. 21 Repudiation of the aforementioned justification is heralded in the 
Chad Mass Violations case, where the Commission held that the Charter 'does not allow 
for state parties to derogate from their treaty obligations .... and even a civil war in Chad 
cannot be used as an excuse by the state violating or permitting violations of rights in the 
African Charter. ' 22 
Charles Dlamini maintains that the presence of clawback clauses in the Charter does not 
offer individuals the same degree of protection provided by derogation clauses contained 
in international covenants and conventions. He believes that derogation clauses are ad-
vantageous to the promotion of human rights for they limit state conduct in two ways; 
through restricting the circumstances where derogation may take place and such clauses 
also define rights that cannot be derogated from and must be respected.23 
Additionally, Christof Heyns is of the view that since the African Charter is silent on the 
issue of derogation, international norms should prevail. He advocates for the amendment 
of the African Charter to include such a clause.24 His view is supported by the fact that 
most African states are parties to both the Charter and the ICCPR which require different 
obligations from states since the latter contains a derogation provision. Sermet poses the 
following quandary; are the actions of a state enduring conflict, justified under Article 4 
of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (CCPR) or with regard to the African 
Charter? He believes that the Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties which attempts to regulate the order of priority among various treaties concerning the 
same matter, does not resolve the question of this conflict of standards. 25 
The need to discuss the importance for a derogation clause in the African context is hence 
demanded. This discussion does not ignore the criticisms that have been set out concern-
2 1 Hickman RT, 'Between human rights and the mle of Jaw: Indefinite detention and the derogation model 
of constitutionalism' 68 The Modern Law Review (2005), 655-668. 
22 Commission Nationale des Droits de I 'Homm e et des Libertes v. Chad, ACmHPR, 21. 
23 Dliamini CRM, 'The protection of human rights in Africa' Published LLM Thesis, University ofZulu-
Jand, KwaZulu-Natal, January 1989, 165. 
24 Heyns C, ' The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?', 162. 
25 Sermet L, 'The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
A critical discussion', 144. 
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ing the doctrine. For instance, states have been said to co-opt and distort the derogation 
regime under international human rights law. The 1997 UNHCR Special Rapporteur 
study highlights the extensive application of derogations; specifically ninety-five states, 
or around half of the countries in the world, had been under a state of emergency, actual 
or declared, during the period of 1985-1997.26 The CCPR expressed concerns over state 
parties that appear to have derogated from rights protected by the Covenant, or whose 
domestic law appears to allow such derogation in situations not covered by Article 4.27 
Additionally, although derogation is an impactful contribution to the making of human 
rights treaties, it does not help their enforcement. A derogation clause thus has a 'poten-
tially negative consequences' as it 'condones a deviation from pre-existing treaty com-
mitments. ' 28 It would therefore conclude that it is one of the techniques that states use to 
limit their international obligations.29 The query thus emerges of the desirability of the 
derogation clause in the African Charter, in light of the criticisms of its presence and ab-
sence in human rights instruments. 
1.8 Theoretical Framework 
1.8.1 Introduction 
This research is informed by the collective and cultural relativism Weltanschauungen, to 
the extent to which these theories are pertinent to the experience of a derogation doctrine. 
26 UCHR: Final report of the Special Rapporteur on the administration ofjustice and the human rights of 
detainees. l2 March 1986, at https :l/documents-dds-
ny.un .org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G95!1 26/75/PDF/G9512675 .pdf?O penElement as cited in Sheeran PS, ' Re-
conceptualizing states of emergency under international human rights law: Theory, legal doctrine, and poli-
tics' 34(3) Michigan Journal of international Law (20 13), 492. 
27 CCPR General Comment No. 29, Article 4: Derogations during a state of emergency, 3 1 August 200 I , I. 
28 Hafner-Burton E, Helfer L, Fariss c, 'Emergency and escape: Explaining derogati ons from human rights 
treati es ' 65 International Organisation (2011), 678, as cited in Ali A, 'Derogation from constitutional rights 
and its implication under the African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights ', 82. 
29 Ouguergouz F, Th e Aji-ican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. A comprehensil'e agenda for human 
dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa, Brill Publishers, Leiden, 2003,423 , as cited in Ali A , 'Dero-
gation from constitutional rights and its implication under the African Charter on Human and Peoples ' 
Rights', 82. 
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1.8.2 African collective theory 
'Sticks in a bundle are unbreakable' 
B d . bw on et prover . · 
African philosophy is unique in its focus on preserving the community. 31 Whereas West-
ern conceptions are concerned with the autonomous individual, African conceptions do 
not know such a thing. Instead, individuals still perceive themselves in their group identi-
ty in traditional Africa;32 therefore concluding the apprehension of the community in that 
without a community, there are neither laws, nor rights. 33 Ibhawoh affirms the latter when 
he stated that: 
'An African concept of human rights is actually a concept of human dignity that defines the inner 
moral nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper relations with society. In pre-
colonial Africa, rights were assigned on the basis of communal membership. '34 
The aforementioned justification promotes the idea that "a person is a person because of 
or through others" translated from the South African Zulu aphorism, 'Umuntu Ngumuntu 
Ngabantu', present in the ubuntu philosophy.35 The object of law would need to go be-
yond the mere resolution of conflict but for the maintenance of the equilibrium of the so-
ciety ... as a corporate whole. 36 Since human rights in Africa can be considered to empha-
sis on collective rights as opposed to individual/7 attention must thus be given to indige-
30 Akoto-Abutiate D, Proverbs and the African tree of life: Grajiing Biblical proverbs on to Ghanaian eve 
folk proverbs, Brill Publishers, Leiden, 2014,78. 
31 Ibhawoh B, Imperialism and human rights: Colonial discourses ofrights and liberties in African history, 
The State University ofNew York Press, New York, 2007. 
32 Shivji I, The concept ofhuman rights in Africa, Codesria Book Series, London, 1989, 12. 
33 Jallow H, Tlze law of the African (Banju l) Charter on Human and People's Rights, Trafford Publishing, 
Victoria, 2007. 
34 lbhawoh B , Imperialism and human rights, 15. 
35 Khomba J, 'Redesigning the balanced scorecard model: An African perspective' Published PhD Thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 2011, 127. 
36 Ademowo AJ, 'Law in traditional Yoruba philosophy: A critical appraisal' 2 Caribbean Journal ofPhi-
losoplzy (2013), 10. Okafor F, 'Legal positivism and the African legal tradition' 24/nternational Philosoph-
ical Quarterzy ( 1984), 161. 
37 Shivji 1, The concept of human rights in Africa, 24. 
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nous values. Consequentially, the notion of individualistic human rights that is reflected 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), indicates a form of the domina-
tion of the Western world.38 The latter is by virtue of the UDHR being articulated as the 
first time in human history, a regime of basic and inalienable rights to which all human 
beings are entitled by virtue of their humanity,39 and yet the declaration was drafted by 
the imperial powers who were actively denying Africans of their right to self determina-
tion during the colonial era. 
The aforementioned posits the that there are two distinct final goods to be promoted, 
namely those of individual freedom and communal relationship.40 However, realities of 
pre colonial and post colonial Africa differ greatly from those of the post colonial Africa. 
This is witnessed with the African Charter's inclusion of both individual rights 41 and 
communal rights. 42 Undoubtedly, Africa presents a paradoxical picture in the sh1dy of 
human rights with different periods contributing significantly to the divergence in the 
conceptual understanding of human rights. 43 It is through this that the complication of 
promotion and protection of human rights resides. 
1.8.3 Cultural relativism theory 
This theory argues that human rights should not be construed as absolute because there is 
infinite cultural variability in every society;44 that even as a matter of customary or con-
ventional international law or a body of substantive human rights norms existing, their 
meanings vary substantially from culture to culh1re. 
38 Mbondenyi M, International human rights and their enforcement in Africa, Law Africa Publishing, Nai-
robi, 20 II, 66. 
39 Ibhawoh 8 , Imperialism and human rights, 17. 
40 Metz T, 'African values and human rights as two sides of the same coin: A reply to Oyowe' 14 African 
Human Rights Law Journal (20 14), 307. 
4 1 Article 2, ACHPR. Article 14, ACHPR. Article 17, ACHPR. Article 18, ACHPR. 
42 Article 29, ACHPR. 
43 Mbondenyi M, International human rights and their enforcement in Africa, 67. 
44 Mbondenyi M, International human rights and their enforcement in Africa, 64. 
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This theory seeks to criticise the manner in which social systems outside Western coun-
tries, were analysed from Western perspective and why they were regarded as inferior.45 
According to Chinua Achebe, the West in post-colonial Africa, desired to 'set up Africa 
as a foil to Europe' .46 On the other hand, Jacktson Ojwang contended that the influence of 
Western jurisprudence in Africa is overwhelming and given the different social context, 
unwarranted. He suggested that jurisprudence needs to be replaced if Africa is to achieve 
its goals.47 Legal philosopher Chinedu Okafor advises local human rights groups to seek 
legitimisation by teasing out and harnessing popular aspects of local cultures.48 
1.8.4 Overview of the theoretical framework 
The aforementioned theories serve as insight to the appositeness of a derogation clause 
within the African Charter. For instance, since the communal rights are held at a higher 
regard than individual rights, legal standards (such as derogation clauses) that favour the 
betterment of protecting peoples' rights should be defended. On the other hand, one may 
argue that since derogation is an internationally accepted norm,49 it does not necessarily 
equate to the cultural values distinctive in contextual Africa. A unique approach must 
therefore be fostered in addressing the African Charter, to the extent of a derogation doc-
trine; keeping in mind its application across different international covenants and conven-
tions. 
45 Ntephe P, ' Does Africa need another kind of law?: Alterity and the rule of law in Subsaharan Africa' 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University ofLondon, 2012,66. 
46 Achebe C, 'An image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's heart of darkness ' 18 The Massachusetts Review 
(1977),782-794 as cited in Ntephe P, 'Does Africa need another kind of law? : Alterity and the mle of law 
in Subsaharan Africa' Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 2012, 70. 
~7 Ojwang JB , Laying a basis for rights: To wards a jurisprudence ofdevelopment, Nairobi Universi ty Press, 
Nairobi, 1992, 351-400 as cited in Ntephe P, ' Does Africa need another kind of law?: Alterity and the mle 
of law in Subsaharan Africa' Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 2012, 72 . 
48 Okafor 0 , ' Modest harvests: On the significant (but limited) impact of human rights NGOs on legislative 
and executive behaviour in Nigeria' 48 Journal ofAfrican Law (2004), 47 as cited in Ntephe P, 'Does Afri-
ca need another kind of law?: Alterity and the rule of law in Subsaharan Africa ' Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of London, 2012, 74-75 . 
49 Jail ow H, The la w of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 32. 
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1.9 Assumptions 
• The doctrine of derogation clause is already an African constitutional practice. 
• The historical development of the derogation clause has played a part in inclusion and 
absence of the derogation clause across international human rights conventions. 
1.10 Methodology 
This research utilises mostly secondary modes of data collection mechanisms. According-
ly, desk research will be extensively used. This include books, journal articles, and decid-
ed cases that provide the requisite information. These sources will be accessible through 
the University 's online databases and library. Internet searches will also assist in the re-
search. These include online journal articles, dissertations, international instruments 
amongst others. 
1.11 Limitations to the Study 
This study is limited to: 
i. Time constraints- This study requires its submission within a prescribed period. 
11. There are few cases documented by the African Commission concerning the deroga-
tion clause. This study, will be forced to explore international and regional cases that 
highlight the same. 
1.12 Chapter Breakdown 
a) Chapter One- Introduction 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the dissertation as is set out above. This entails 
giving a background and reasons for the research, as well as defining the parameters of 
the study and the methodology to be used. 
b) Chapter Two- The Development of The Derogation Clause Across International Con-
ventions 
This chapter conceptualises the derogation clause across three international human rights 
conventions. It will also seek to briefly mention the drafting process of the African Char-
ter and how this process may have led to the absence of the clause. 
c) Chapter Three- African Constitutions And The Derogation Clause 
10 
This chapter looks to derogation practices in six African states and their inclusion of the 
derogation clauses in the respective constitutions. 
d) Chapter Four- Implications of Establishing A Derogation Clause In The African 
Charter 
This chapter explores the plausible reasons for the omission of the derogation clause in 
the Charter, and the justification and need for the use of this derogation doctrine. It also 
focuses on the conflicting thoughts on the inclusion of the clause. 
e) Chapter Five- Conclusion and Recommendation 
This chapter concludes the study and gives recommendations on how the derogation 
clause may be applied in the African Charter. 
II 
CHAPTER TWO 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEROGATION CLAUSE ACROSS IN-
TERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
2.0 Introduction 
Chapter one served to introduce this research, in regards to the objectives of this disserta-
tion, the theory underpinning derogation clauses, as well as a snippet as to what the 
Academy garners in respect to this doctrine. This chapter proffers the conceptual under-
pinnings of the derogation clause across international and regional conventions. 
2.1 Background of derogation 
The inclusion of derogation clauses in international human rights instmments represents a 
concession to the belief that when governments perceive threats to the nation, they will 
inevitably take action. 50 Historically, the earliest development of emergency regimes, 
hails from the Roman Republic. The Roman Republic is appreciated for giving a good set 
of rules for states of emergency. 51 It is said to have influenced the way in which the dero-
gation clauses in post-World War II constitutions and in human rights treaties like the 
ECHR and the ICCPR, have been stmctured and interpreted. 52 
2.1.1 Suspension of treaty obligations in general public international law 
Further development concerning the justification of States to suspend from their treaty 
obligations is witnessed in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCL T) and Article 25 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The former highlights the real-
ity that a party under the VCL T, who invokes the suspension of its treaty operations, shall 
50 Ryspaeva A, ' Justification of derogations of human rights in emergency situations ' Published LLM The-
sis, Central European University, 2015, 57. 
51 Loof JP, ' Crisis situations, counter terrorism and derogation from the European Convention on Human 
Rights. A threat analysis' in Buyse A.C ( ed), Margins of conflict. The ECHR and transitions to and from 
armed conflict, Antwerp-Cambridge-Portland: Intersentia, Cambridge, 20 I 0, 36. 
52 Loof JP, Human rights and national security: compatible entities? Derogation and restriction of human 
rights during states of emergency and other situations that threaten national sewrity, Nijmegen: Wolf Le-
gal Publishers, Leiden, 2005, 34-35. 
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indicate the measures proposed to be taken with respect to the treaty and the reasons 
therefor. 53 The latter declares that necessity may be invoked on States' as a ground for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act, not in conformity with a States' international obli-
gation, if it is the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
imminent peril. 54 
Interestingly, the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear 
Weapons also provides for some form of justification for the suspension of treaty obliga-
tions, during times of war or national emergencies. Although this Advisory Opinion 
acknowledges the right to life as a non-derogable right by virtue of the ICCPR's provi-
sions, the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life is to be determined by the appli-
cable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict, which is designed to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities. 55 
2.2 Derogation under International Conventions 
The derogation clauses across the various regional and international conventions are simi-
lar in that they establish two central standards for a valid derogation clause; that a public 
emergency must exist which 'threatens the life of the nation' and measures taken, con-
cerning this public emergency, should strictly be required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion. Although this may be the case, they differ in the manner concerning application, im-
plementation and their non-derogable rights. 
53 Article 62 (1), VCLT. 
54 Draft articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, ILC 53rd Report, 2001, UN Doc 
A/56/ 10. 
55 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 226 ( ! 996), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 25 . 
See also para 79 that stipulates of the intransgressible principles of international customary law that all 
states must adhere to whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, this is in context 
of derogation being a custom. See also para 97 that states that the Court cannot reach a definitive conclu-
sion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of 
self-defence. 
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2.2.1 Early ECHR drafts included derogation clauses 
The derogation clause, in the initial phases of drafting the ECHR, was absent. 56 The 
Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly instead, relied on the comparative studies of 
the United Nations drafts. The latter rendered the existence of a general limitation clause 
satisfactory in limiting a state party's actions during emergency periods. 57 During the 
conference, debates ensued between opposing fronts. On one hand, were the delegates 
that advocated for the inclusion of a specific derogation clause; with the United Kingdom 
spearheading the latter by producing a detailed proposal suggesting for both a derogation 
article and exceptions clauses. 58 On the other hand, were those that advocated for a more 
general approach when defining rights and limitations (Italian and French experts protest-
ed a derogation article due to its inconsistency with enumerations). 59 However, the dele-
gates in finalising the final draft, drew inspiration from the ICCPR drafts as well as the 
proposal from the British government. The Senior Officials of the Council of Europe, 
presented the Convention for signature on November 4, 1950, with the derogation clause 
included. 
2.2.2 Derogation under the ECHR 
The derogation clause, according to Article 15, states that derogation is permitted in times 
of war or other public emergency, 'threatening the life of the nation'. Over the years, 
since its entry into force, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has interpreted 
the derogation clause to express the following: 
56 Hartman J, ' Derogation from human rights treaties in public emergencies, A critique of implementation 
by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee of the United 
Nations' 22 Harvard International Law Journal ( 1981 ), 5. 
A striking feature of the Travaux Preparatoires is the brief and limited reference to public emergencies and 
the principle of derogation orders as is stated in Cowell F, 'Sovereignty and the question of derogation' , 
144. 
57 Collected Edition of the 'Travaux Preparatoires' of the European Convention on Human Rights Council 
ofEurope 1975, 138. 
58 Hartman J, 'Derogation from human rights treaties in public emergencies' , 5. 
59 Hartman J, 'Derogation from human rights treaties in public emergencies', 5. 
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i) The ECHR is subject to a strict, impartial and non-politicised international supervision 
by its European Commission on Human Rights (that was abolished in 1998) and the 
ECtHR. 60 
ii) That Article 15 only has effect if the State concerned issues a formal declaration of 
derogation.61 However, the member states have been shown to have considerable de-
lays in submitting to this requirement of notification ie. United Kingdom. 62 
iii) Discretion vis-a-vis derogation was left to States by the vague language of the 
ECHR. 63 In A and Others v United Kingdom, 64 the ECtHR concluded that each Con-
tracting State is responsible for determining whether that life is threatened by 'public 
emergency' and if so, how far is it necessary to overcome this emergency. The mem-
ber states thus have a better understanding of national issues as opposed to an interna-
tional judge who is not in direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the 
6-
country at that moment. ) 
iv) Although the Court casts a wide net of margin of appreciation over a state, the ECtHR 
upholds that such discretion is not unlimited and is subject to the scrutiny of European 
supervision. The state centric analysis has however been criticised, 66 as is stated 
above for entrusting member states with such discretionary powers. In the Lawless v 
Ireland case, the ECtHR sought to limit the latter by stating that the term, ' threatening 
the life of a nation' in this case, was determined to mean 'exceptional situations of cri-
sis' which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of 
the community of which the state is composed.67 
60 Schreuer C, 'Derogation of human rights in situations of public emergency: The experience of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights' 9 Yale Journal of International Law (1982), 116. 
61 lwyeva v. Russia, ECtHR Judgement of 24 February 2005, para. l91. 
62 Schreuer C, 'Derogation of human rights in situations of public emergency ', 119. 
63 Mokhtar A, 'Human rights obligations v. derogations: Article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights ' 8( 1) International Journal of Human Rights (2004), 65 . 
64 A and others v United Kingdom, ECtHR Judgment of 19 February 2009, para. 173. 
65 Ireland v United Kingdom, ECtHR Judgement of 18 January 1978, para. 207. 
66 Janis M, Kay R, Bradley A, European human rights law, Oxford University Press, London, 2008, 71 . 
67 Lawless v b·eland, ECtHR Judgment of 1 July 1961, para. 26 and 90. 
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2.2.3 Initial opposition to derogation provisions in the ICCPR 
The preparatory works of the derogation clause in the ICCPR appeared in the earliest 
days of drafting the Covenant. Although opposition to the derogation clause is said to 
have been rather mute, its specific terms inspired extensive debate .68 The British govern-
ment emphasised when arguing in favour of the ICCPR's derogation clause in 1947, that 
'under general international law in time of war, States were not strictly bound by conven-
tional obligations unless the conventions contained provisions to the contrary' .69 The US 
delegation opposed the clause arguing, that a single general limitation clause was prefer-
able,70 while Yugoslavia protested that the 'moral effect' of a covenant, which stressed 
restrictions, would be 'disastrous'. 71 After further debates and overall disagreements be-
tween present States, the Drafting Committee72 of 1947, learning its lesson from the vi-
cious war, concluded that the main focus of the provision was to minimise the risk of 
abuse and ensuring States are bound by their legal human rights obligations, even in 
armed conflicts and similar crisis situations.73 (Interestingly, the derogation provision was 
discussed prior to the adoption of the UDHR which does not contain a derogation provi-
sion) The Covenant was adopted on 19 December 1966. 
The normative derogation provision, under Article 4 of the ICCPR, states that when a 
'public emergency threatening the life of the nation' is proclaimed, a State party may der-
ogate from their obligations, only to the 'extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation'.74 Although the latter has endured critique for its inconclusive nature/5 the rei-
68 Hartman J, ' Derogation from human rights treaties in public emergencies', 8. 
69 Simpson B, Human rights and the end of empire: Britain and the genesis of the European Convention, 
Oxford University Press, London, 200 I, 477. 
70 Hartman J, 'Derogation from human rights treaties in public emergencies', 8. 
71 Hartman J, 'Derogation from human rights treaties in public emergencies', 5. 
72 The Drafting Committee was appointed in 1947 by the Commission on Human Rights to prepare a draft 
declaration and covenant on human rights . 
73 Loof JP, 'Crisis situations, counter terrorism and derogation from the European Convention on Human 
Rights' , 38. 
74 Article 4 (I), ICCPR. 
75 Becker M, 'An Escape from the perceived rationalist-constructivist binary: A look into derogable inter-
national human rights agreements' Unpublished International and Comparative Studies Thesis, University 
ofMichigan, Michigan, 2015, 66. 
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evant authorities (including the CCPR) have established the following regime in interpret-
ing the clause: 
For one, even when states are faced with armed conflict or a terrorist attack, it does not 
equate to imposition of restrictions on human rights, being justified.76 The Siracusa Prin-
ciples although not binding, advance the latter by specifying that exceptional circum-
stances are those of imminent and actual danger, as opposed to internal conflicts and un-
rest that do not constitute a grave and imminent threat to justify derogation under the arti-
cle.77 In the Consuela Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia case, the CCPR stated that the mere 
declaration of the existence of a state of emergency is insufficient, and states are bound 
'to give a sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts to show that a situation of the 
kind described in article 4 (1) exists in the country concerned'. 78 
Additionally, the validity of the derogation clause also depends on the official proclama-
tion of a State party. 79 This condition is designed to force derogating parties to act openly 
from the outset of the emergency and to delegitimise after the fact justifications for viola-
tions of human rights .80 Notification of the derogation81 requires that a State party avail-
ing itself of the right of derogation, shall immediately inform the other States parties to 
the Covenant through the United Nations Secretary General, of the provisions from which 
it has derogated and the reason for these measures. 82 
76 CCPR General Comment No. 29, 2. 
77 UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984, E/CN .4/ 1985/4. 
78 Consuela Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia CCPR Comm. No. 64/ 1979 (24 March 1982) para. I 0.3. 
The committee has previously upheld this position in the Jorge Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay case where it 
was held that ' the State Party is duty-bound to give a sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts when 
it invokes Article 4(1)' the committee's function is therefore ' to see to it that States Parties live up to their 
commitments under the Covenant. Jorge Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay CCPR Comm. No. 34/ 1978 (8 April 
1981) para. 8.3. 
79 Article 4 (I), ICCPR. 
80 Siehr A, 'Derogation measures under Article 4ICCPR, with special consideration of the war against in-
ternational terrorism' 4 7 German Yearbook oflnternational Law (2004 ), 553. 
81 Article 4 (3), JCCPR. 
82 Siehr A, 'Derogation measures under Article 4 ICCPR, with special consideration of the war agai nst in-
ternational terrorism', 553. 
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Some State parties have never fully respected treaty obligations. For instance, Trinidad 
and Tobago declared a vague and abstract notification in 1995.83 The country also crafti-
ly, in its reservation against Article 4 (specifically paragraph 2), aimed at eliminating any 
accusation of Trinidad and Tobago violating non-derogable rights. 84 Additionally, the 
United States, following the aftermath of 9/ 11, never notified a state of public emergency 
pursuant to Article 4, 85 yet over 600 persons suspected of being terrorist were detained at 
Guantanamo Bay with a few having been charged. 86 
2.2.3 Derogation under the ACHR 
The drafting negotiation of the ACHR, held around 1969, was less difficult than other 
human rights instruments as a result of the ICCPR serving as a model for the working 
draft. 87 During the drafting negotiation conference, El Salvador's delegation proposed the 
derogation clause to include the terms "or other public calamity" ('u otra calamidad 
publica') . El Salvador's bided that the term, involved a situation was not necessarily a 
The Siracusa Principles also provide for five specific elements that every notification should contain in or-
der to provide sufficient information. 
83 The unclear provision reads that ' action has been taken or is immediately threatened by persons or bodies 
of persons of such a nah1re and on so extensive scale as to be likely to endanger the public safety or to de-
prive the community of supplies or services essential to life ' as cited in Siehr A, 'Derogation measures un-
der Article 4 ICCPR, with special consideration of the war against international terrorism' , 55 I. 
84 The HRC, recognising the counter-productivism of reservations to article 4 of the ICCPR, held in the 
General Comment 24 that the commission has the power to determine whether a specific reservation is 
compatible with the object and the purpose of the treaty. 
Siehr A, 'Derogation measures under Article 4 ICCPR, with special consideration of the war against inter-
national terrorism' , 558. 
85 Siehr A, ' Derogation measures under Article 4 ICCPR, with special consideration of the war against in-
ternational terrorism', 571 . 
86 Siehr A, ' Derogation measures under Article 4 ICCPR, with special consideration of the war against in-
ternational terrorism', 573 . 
87Faulkner E, 'The right to habeas corpus : Only in the other Americas ' 9 American University International 
La w Review (1994) , 665. 
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threat to internal or external security, but which could nevertheless arise.88 Distinctively 
Mexico's delegation proposed to delete among other things, the principle of non-
derogable rights from the Convention; other member states refuted both this sugges-
tions.89 
Although the derogation provision has been critiqued for being loosely drafted as com-
pared to other human rights instruments,90 the Convention revels in having eleven non-
derogable clauses, four more non-derogable rights than the ICCPR and seven more than 
the ECHR. The Inter American Commission on Human Right (IACmHR) has exception-
ally recognised that while economic and social deprivations may explain human rights 
violations, they cannot justify denials of civil and political rights91 during state emergen-
cies. The IACmHR has also stated that the right to due process or 'essential judicial guar-
antees' must be preserved during states of emergency. 92 The derogation clause is also 
drafted differently from the other aforesaid international human rights agreements, in that 
Article 27 states that derogation is permitted during, time of war, public danger, or other 
emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party. Such derogation 
should not involve discrimination on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
or social origin. 93 
2.2.4 Derogation under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
Before the negotiations for drafting the Charter began, African states in the 1970's en-
joyed the principle of non-interference, in continental human rights adherence and obliga-
88 United Nations, 'Human rights in the administration of justice: A manual on human rights for judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers'The administration ofjustice during states of emergency, in Professional Training 
Series (9) 2003, 820. 
89 Tessema B, 'A critical analysis of non-derogable rights in a state of emergency under the African system: 
The case of Ethiopia and Mozambique' Unpublished LLM Thesis, Eduardo Mondlane University, 31 Octo-
ber 2005, 12 . 
90 Nmehielle V, The African human rights system: Its laws, practises and institutions Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, The Hague, 2001, 59. 
91 Hartman J, 'Working paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 derogation provision' 7 Human 
Rights Quarterly, (1985), 95. 
92 O'Donnell D, 'Commentary by the Rapporteur on derogation' 7 Human Rights Quarterly , ( 1985), 32. 
93 Article 27 (1), ACHR. 
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tions. 94 Indeed there was a juridical void in African regional rights promotion and protec-
tion and the human rights abuses of the 1970s in Amin's Uganda, Nguema's Equatorial 
Guinea and Bokassa's Central African Republic,95 brought on pressure for change. 
The drafting of the African Charter was to ensue, with the obligation of responding to Af-
rican needs, in the sense of incorporating African traditional values and civilisation; 
which in turn should inspire and characterise the reflection and conception of African 
human rights. 96 Therefore in July 1979, African leaders, in a historic decision, declared 
themselves conscious of the fact that a political regime, which protects fundamental hu-
man rights, is indispensable.97 Events such as the 'Law of Lagos' , the Dakar Declaration, 
negotiations by African experts and lawyers in Dakar, Monrovia and Banjul and Nairobi, 
led to the adoption ofthe African Charter in Nairobi, in 1981 .98 
Accordingly, moderate discussions prevailed concerning the inclusion of a derogation 
provision in the African Charter. During the meeting of experts in Dakar, Senegal, the 
highly respected President of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor advised experts by stress-
ing that, 'room should be made for African tradition in the (African) Charter' .99 It was 
hence agreed that it would be merely futile to present the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) with a carbon copy of other international instruments, which because of their uni-
versality, did not focus specifically on African concerns and traditional values. In light of 
the continuous advice of President Senghor, the experts were extremely mindful of avoid-
ing derogations from principles of human rights that had been universally accepted. 100 
94 Viljoen F, International human rights la w in Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 158. 
95 Viljoen F, International human rights law in Africa, 158. 
96 Nmehielle V, The African human rights system, 83 . 
97 Ouguergouz F, The African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights, 39. 
Jallow H, The law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People 's Rights, 32. 
98 Jallow H, The law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People 's Rights, 25-63. 
99 Jallow H, The law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 29. 
100 Jallow H, The law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 31. 
20 
2.3 Derogation, limitation and clawback clauses 
Discrepancies in the application of the derogation provisions were prevalent in the draft-
ing negotiations of both the ICCPR and the ECHR. Opponents of the derogation clause 
during the drafting of the ICCPR argued that the eventualities of the derogation clause 
were sufficiently covered by the relevant limitation clause and that limitation clauses can 
be invoked in times of emergency. 101 Despite the fact that the derogation and limitation 
clauses both aim at interfering with substantive human right obligations, they should not 
be confused as they serve different purposes. 
The idea of limitations is based on the recognition that most human rights are not absolute 
but rather reflect a balance between individual and community interests. 102 Such an impo-
sition on rights has resulted in limitations being referred to as 'ordinary' limitations, in so 
far as they can be imposed permanently during times of peace. 103 A limitation, when ap-
plied, 'must be necessary in a democratic society' .104 
Unlike limitations, derogations must be as restrictive as possible 105 for their operation 
suspends a right completely, resulting in a total paralysis of a norm. 106 These extra-
ordinary limitations107 are relevant in tackling exceptional circumstances such as serious 
101 Tessema B, 'A critical analysis of non-derogable rights in a state of emergency under the African sys-
tem: The case of Ethiopia and Mozambique' Unpublished LLM Thesis, Eduardo Mondlane University, 31 
October 2005, 13 . 
102 UN Commission on Human Rights, The individual's duties to the community and the limitations on hu-
man rights and freedoms under article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights A contribution to 
the freedom of the individual under law, 10 March 1981, E/CN.4/RES/19(XXXVII) . 
103 United Nations, 'Human rights in the administration of justice' 814. 
104 Article 8( l ), ECHR. See also Article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya which gives a detailed expounding 
on limitations 
105 Faulkner E, 'The right to habeas corpus: Only in the other Americas', 687. 
106 Ouguergouz F, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 436. 
107 Svensson-McCarthy AL, The international law of human rights and states of exception: With special 
reference to the Travaux Preparatories and case-la w of the international monitoring bodies, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1998, 49. 
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crisis situations 108 in order to meet the exigencies of the situations. They are thus tempo-
rary in nature. 109 
On the other hand, special limitations exist, well known as clawback clauses. Although 
present in other human rights instruments, 110 they distinctively feature in the African 
Charter. Clawback clauses in the African Charter include 'subject to law and order', 111 
provided that he abides with the law', 112 in accordance with the provisions of the law, 113 
'in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate law', 114 'except for reasons and 
conditions previously laid down by law. 115 
2.4 Conclusion 
From this discussion, one can appreciate the divergent avenues that different international 
human rights instruments sought to come to the conclusion of a derogation clause within 
their respective treaties . The negotiating history of both the ECHR and ICCPR show that 
in the late 1940s, derogation clauses were viewed by states with suspicion. Further, the 
chapter briefly argued for the justification of the doctrine and how the various treaties 
have included the derogation provision. This chapter illustrated the history of the African 
Charter and a possible rationale as to the omission of the derogation clause within its pro-
visions. The latter shall be crucial in the proceeding chapters for it aids in accentuating 
the discrepancy between the African Charter and African constitutional practice that pro-
vide for derogation clauses. 
10~ Loof JP, 'Crisis Situations, counter terrorism and derogation from the European Convention on Human 
Rights', 43. 
109 Loof JP, 'Crisis Situations, counter terrorism and derogation from the European Convention on Human 
Rights' , 42. 
110 Atiicle 12(3), JCCPR. 
111 Article 8, ACHPR. 
11 2 Article 12,ACHPR. 
113 Article 13 , A CHP R. 
114 Atiicle 14, ACHPR. 
11 5 Article 6, ACHPR. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS AND THE DEROGATION CLAUSE 
3.0 Introduction 
The Permanent Court of International Justice affirmed that 'the court declines to see in 
the conclusion of any treaty, by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from per-
forming a particular act, an abandonment of its sovereignty'. 116 The previous chapter 
showcased the derogation provisions across various international human rights conven-
tions and how the different relevant treaties have chosen to interpret and put in practice 
the derogation clause. 
As stated in Chapter one, some African constitutions 117 contain derogation clauses that 
become operational in the cases of exceptional circumstances, crisis war. It can thus be 
elucidated that a common African constitutional standard is not reflected in the African 
Charter. 11 8 Presumptively, the African Charter has no restraining influence on States 
when they are ignoring the Charter by including the clause. 119 Below are some African 
states that contain the derogation clauses in their respective constitutions. 
3.1 Ethiopia 
Chapter 3 of Ethiopia's 1995 Constitution contains the bill of rights that provides for civ-
il, political, economic and cultural rights. The emergency clause is stipulated in Chapter 
11 of the Constitution and is therefore not part of the Bill of Rights provisions. The latter 
has been criticised as a dangerous move, for the derogation clause is not subject to the 
interpretations clause, applicable to the Bill of Rights; hence no constitutional imperative 
116 S.S. 'Wimbledon ' Case, (Britain eta/. v. Germany) , Judgement of 17 August 1923 , PCIJ, para. 25. 
117 Section 45(2), Constitution o}Nigeria (1999). Article 93 ( 4), Constitution ofEthiopia ( 1995). Article 52, 
Constitution of Angola ( 1992). Article 46, Constitution of Cape Verde ( 1992). Article 31, Constitution of 
Guinea-Bissau ( 1984). Article 72, Constitution ofMozambique (2004). Article 27(5)(a), Constitution of 
Eritrea (1997) . Article 24(3), Constitution of Namibia (1990) . Article 137, Constitution of Rwanda (2003). 
Section 38, Constitution ofSwaziland (2005) . Article 44, Constitution of Uganda ( 1995). 
11 8 Sermet L, 'The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights', 
144. 
11 9 Heyns C, 'The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?' , 162. 
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for their interpretation in light of international human rights instruments. 120 The clause 
gives power to the Federal government to declare a state of emergency should an external 
invasion, a break down of law and order (which endangers the constitutional order and 
which cannot be controlled by the regular law enforcement agencies and personnel), a 
natural disaster or an epidemic, occur. 121 
Accordingly, when a state of emergency is declared in Ethiopia, the Council of Ministers 
shall have all the necessary powers to protect the country's peace and sovereignty, and to 
maintain public security, law and order. 122 A state of emergency, if approved by the 
House of Representatives may remain in effect for a maximum of six months. It should be 
noted that Ethiopia declared a state of emergency on October 2016 that lasted 10 
months. 123 The African Commission, during its 59th Ordinary Session, condemned the 
deterioration of human rights in the country, urging the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia to lift the ban on movement, assembly, media access, and internet services that 
became prevalent with the declaration of state emergency. 124 
The African Commission also showed concern over the arbitrary arrests and detention of 
citizens, 125 a concern shared by Ethiopian Mr Feyisa Lilesa, who after winning a silver 
medal, in the 2016 Olympic marathon, held his arms above his head in an "X," as a sign 
of protest against his government. Ethiopia has acceded to the ICCPR126 that provides for 
a derogation clause. And yet, as of 2017, the Ethiopian government had not sent notifica-
tion of the declaration of the state of emergency and the derogations as required by the 
120 Techane M, 'The impact of the African Charter and the Maputo Protocol in Ethiopia' in Ayeni V (ed), 
The impact of the African Charter and the Maputo Protocol in selected African states, Pretoria University 
Law Press, Pretoria, 2016, 62. 
121 Article 95, Constitution of Ethiopia (1995). 
122 Article 95 (4), Constitution ofEthiopia (1995). 
123 Human Rights Watch, State ofemergency ends in Ethiopia: Government should use reform, not force, to 
avoid more protests, 7 August 2013 <https ://www.hrw.org/news/20 17/08/07/state-emergency-ends-ethiopia 
124 ACHPR/Res. 356(LIX) 2016 Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the Federal Democratic Re-
public of Ethiopia . 
125 ACHPR/Res. 356(LIX) 2016 Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the Federal Democratic Re-
public of Ethiopia. 
126 Ethiopia acceded to the ICCPR on 11 June 1993 . 
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Covenant. Ethiopia ended its state emergency, 10 months after its declaration, four 
months supplementary than is required, in their municipallaws. 127 Significantly, on Feb-
ruary 20 18, Ethiopia declared another state of emergency that is intended to last six 
months. 128 
3.2. Kenya 
The 2010 Kenyan Constitution provides in its Bill of Rights Article 58, that legislation 
enacted as a consequence of a state emergency, may limit a right or fundamental freedom 
in the Bill of Rights. However, this derogation provision is subject to the extent that the 
limitation is strictly required by the emergency, as well as the laws enacted, are consistent 
with the Republic's obligations under international law applicable to a state of emergen-
cy. 129 A state emergency can be declared in the scenarios where the State is threatened by 
war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergen-
cy. 13° Kenya's 2010 Constitution is appreciated appraisal for being progressive in Ken-
ya's constitutional history, in that the previous constitution had countless clawback claus-
es, that defeated the very essence of guaranteeing human rights. 131 
Kenya being party to the ACHPR, has an obligation to adhere to its provisions that does 
not provide for derogation. A discrepancy ensues for Kenya is also state party to the IC-
CPR, having acceded to it on 1 May 1972. Such conflict of state obligation has been criti-
cised by Kenyan scholars, 132 in that it is putting Kenya at odds with the African Charter, 
posing challenges especially during review of the state by the relevant treaty bodies as 
well as in the course of litigating the Bill of Rights. In the Kenyan case of Martha Karua 
127 Article 72, Constitution of Ethiopia ( 1995). 
128 Agence France-Presse, 'Ethiopia state of emergency to last six months' Daily Nation, 17 February 2018 
- <https ://www .nation.co.ke/news/africa/Ethiopia-state-of-emergency-to-last -six -months-/ ! 066-43 09234-
saaOisz/ index. html> on l March 201 8. 
129 Article 58(3), Constitution of Kenya (20 l 0) . 
130 Article 58, Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0) . 
131 Am bani JO, MK Mbondenyi, 'A new era in human rights protection in Kenya? An analysis of the salient 
features ofthe 2010 Constitution ' s Bill of Rights' in Mbondenyi MK, Asaala EO, Kabau T, Wari s A, Hu-
man rights and democratic governance in Kenya: A post-2007 appraisal, Pretoria University Law Press, 
2015, 18. 
132 JO Ambani & MK Mbondenyi 'A new era in human rights protection in Kenya?', 29-30. 
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v Radio Africa, the High Court at Nairobi acknowledged this contradiction and held that 
the, 'African Charter does not allow any derogations, and therefore there is need to har-
monise this in any future Constitutional dispensation' .133 
3.3. Malawi 
Article 45 of the I 994 Malawian Constitution provides that no derogation from the rights, 
envisaged in its Chapter 4, shall be permissible save for a declaration of a state emergen-
cy. Other than the Constitution giving stricter provisions as to when a derogation clause is 
applicable, (mimicking that of the ICCPR provisions) it is interesting to note that it does 
not permit derogation during a state emergency when such derogation is not inconsistent 
with the obligations of Malawi under international law. 134 Although the African Charter is 
recognised as a major international human rights document in Malawi, 135 the application 
of international law by the national courts, would strive to ensure an interpretation that 
does not contradict the Constitution or any domestic statutes, but where this is not possi-
ble, domestic law will always prevail. 136 
Unsurprisingly, international human rights standards have thus had little practical impact 
in Malawi. 137 In the 1992 Chihana v R case the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal 
(MSCA) recognised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as forming part 
of Malawian law but rejected the applicability of the African Charter in Malawi. The 
MSCA asserted that unless the country takes legislative measures to adopt the African 
Charter, it is not part of the municipal law of Malawi. 138 The stagnation of international 
human rights 'applicability' was remedied with the fact that all international agreements 
133 Martha Karua v Radio Africa Ltd t/a Kiss F.M. Station & 2 others [2004] eKLR 10. 
134 Article 45(3) (b), Constitution ofMalawi ( 1994 ). 
135 Jumbe and Another v Attorney General, [2005] MWHC 15 as cited in Chisala-Tempelhoff S, Bakare SS 
'The impact of the African Charter and the Maputo Protocol in Malawi' in Ayeni V (ed) , The impact ofthe 
African Charter and the Maputo Protocol in selected African states, Pretoria University Law Press, Preto-
ria,2016, 155. 
136 Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA), Malawi, undated, 38. 
137 Chirwa D, 'Democratisation in Malawi 1994-2002: Completing the vicious circle?' 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights (2003), 328 as cited in the Institute for International and Comparative Law in 
Africa (ICLA), Malawi, undated, 27. 
138 Chilwna v R Criminal, [1993] MSCA. 
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entered into prior to the 1994 Malawian Constih1tion or after the Constitution are binding 
on Malawi only if they are not in conflict with any domestic legislation. 139 This would 
mean that the ICCPR, that Malawi acceded to on 22 December 1993, which provides for 
a derogation provision; thus establishing a discord amongst Malawi's obligations under 
international human rights instruments. 
3.4. Gambia 
Gambia holds an intriguing history with regards to the African Charter. Not only is Gam-
bia the headquarters ofthe African Commission (and its Secretariat) as of 12 June 1989 to 
present day Africa, but it is worth noting that most of the drafting of the African Charter 
took place in the capital city of Gambia, Banjul; hence the firm referral of the Charter as 
the Banjul Charter, after its birthplace. 
Granted that Gambia ratified the African Charter on 8 June 1983, the Gambian Constitu-
tion contrarily includes of a derogation clause; it authorises the taking of measures that 
are reasonably justifiable for dealing with periods of emergency that exists in the coun-
try. 140 These measures are limited in their efforts to protect human rights as compared to 
other constitutions and international human rights instruments. These rights include the 
right to life, freedom from inhumane treatment or torture. Instead, the Gambian constitu-
tion uniquely alludes to the non-derogable nature of the right to liberty, privacy and the 
secure protection of the law. 141 Ineffective human rights laws at the national level, depicts 
the lack of seriousness among states especially Gambia to uphold the values and rights 
entrenched in the African Charter. The latter is evidently so, with the termination of ap-
pointment of Justice Hassan Jallow by the President in 2003. This move is reported to 
have occurred after Justice Jallow, presided over high- profile constih1tional cases in the 
Supreme Court in which several provisions of controversial Acts of the National Assem-
139 Institute for International and Comparati ve Law in Africa (ICLA), Malawi, undated, 38. 
140 Article 35(1), Constitution ofGambia (1997). 
Rights pertaining to privacy, speech, conscience, assembly, association, movement, fair play and personal 
liberty, can be presumed to acquire the status of non-derogable rights under this provision. 
14 1 Article 35(2), Constitution of Gambia ( 1997). 
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bly were invalidated for contravening the Constitution and the African Charter. 142 This 
goes to demonstrate that the state authorities cannot evaluate a situation in the country as 
objectively as possible 143 especially if their powers extend to the derogation of human 
rights provisions during states of emergencies. 
3.5 Cameroon 
The Republic of Cameroon ratified the African Charter on 20 June 1989, whereas the Re-
public acceded to the ICCPR on 27 Jun 1984. Distinctively, Cameroon's derogation 
clause provides that the president may, where circumstances so warrant, declare by decree 
a state of emergency, which shall confer upon him, such special powers as may be pro-
vided for by law. 144 A serious threat to the nation's territorial integrity or to its existence, 
its independence or institutions, would lead the president to take any measures as he may 
deem necessary. 145 With the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon endorsing such blanket pro-
visions, it is peculiar that Cameroon has remained silent when exceptional circumstances, 
that could have justified the enforcement of an emergency regime, have transpired. 
Whether it be the repeated volcanic eruptions ( 1959, 1982, 1989, 1999 and 2000) of 
Mount Cameroon, the deadly gas emission of Lake Nyos nor even the current substantial 
terrorist attacks by the Islamic movement Boko Haram in the northern region of Came-
roon, state of emergencies have not been declared. 146 
However, a de facto emergency was declared when protests erupted in 2008, that ques-
tioned the Presidency of President Biya, Cameroon's President since 1982. The army was 
deployed to restore 'peace and order', peace and order that caused the deaths of 139 peo-
ple. 147 It may thus be assumed that the exercise of the derogation clause is being exerted 
142 lnstitute for International and Comparative Law in Africa, The 1997 Constitution of The Gambia, undat-
ed, 22. 
143 Ryspaeva A, 'Justification of derogations of human rights in emergency situations' Published LLM The-
sis, Central European University, 2015, 12 . 
144 Article 9( 1 ), Constitution of Cameroon (1996) . 
145 A11icle 9(2), Constitution ofCameroon (1996). 
146 Kamga G, ' Emergency regimes in Cameroon: Derogation or failure? of the law,' 25 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (20 17), 521. 
147 Kamga G, 'Emergency regimes in Cameroon: Derogation or failure? of the law,' 527. 
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for tyrannical purposes; affirming the fear that derogations are inappropriate for the pro-
motion of human rights. 148 
3.7 Nigeria 
The 1999 Federal Republic of Nigeria's Constitution provides a veritable foundation up-
on which any law invalidating fundamental rights may be justified. 149 The derogation 
clause thus stipulates that, nothing, be it the right to private and family life, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and the press, right to peaceful 
assembly and association and right to freedom of movement, shall be invalidated by a 
reasonably justifiable law in a democratic society. 150 However, this is subject to limitation 
of periods of emergency; specifically to the interest of defence, public safety, public or-
der, public morality or public health; or for the purpose of protecting the rights and free-
dom or other persons. 151 
The aforementioned constitutional provision was upheld in the Supreme Court decision of 
Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Emewulu & Ano/52 that reit-
erated that all freedoms are limited by state policy and interest. The corrosive effect of the 
derogation clause on the integrity of human rights in Nigeria is hence questioned, granted 
the backdrop that Nigeria is party to the African Charter. 
The Charter should thus be respected and possess a greater vigour and strength than any 
other domestic statute, as was asserted by Nigerian Justice Mohammed. 153 The African 
Commission affirming the latter, in the Media Rights Agenda case, where it held that 'the 
African Charter does not contain a derogation clause. Therefore limitations on the rights 
1 4~ Higgins R, 'Derogation under human rights treaties,' 48 British Year Book oflnternational Law ( 1977), 
282. 
149 Dada JA, 'Impediments to human rights protection in Nigeria ' 18 Annual Survey oj1nternational & 
Comparative Law, (20 12), 78. 
150 Article 45( I), Constitution of Federal Republic ofNigeria ( 1999). 
151 Article 45( 1) (a), Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria ( 1999). Article 45( 1) (b), Constitution of 
Federal Republic ofNigeria ( 1999). 
152 Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplina1y Tribunal v Emewulu, [2001] 3 S.C.N.J. 73 as quoted in 
Dada JA, 'Impediments to human rights protection in Nigeria' , 77. 
153 General Sanni Abacha and others v ChiefGani FalVehinmi, [2000) 6 NWLR 251 . 
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and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies or special cir-
cumstances'.154 The Commission opined that 'to allow national law to have precedent 
over the international law of the Charter would defeat the purpose of the rights and free-
doms enshrined in the Charter. International human rights standards must always prevail 
over contradictory national law'. 155 Albeit the Commission's assertion, the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria, in the Abacha v Fawehinmi case unanimously decided that the Constitu-
tion is superior to the African Charter, but the African Charter is superior to municipal 
legislation. 156 Confusion as to the place of derogation in Nigeria, in light of its Charter 
and constitutional obligation is thus showcased. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In light of the various constitutions presented above, vanous derogation clauses have 
been drafted differently to cater for each sovereign country. This creates a predicament 
where the clauses are not only too wide but ill-defined and nebulous, concurring Heyns 
argument that the African Charter has 'no restraining influence on states' when they are 
ignoring the Charter by including the clause. 157 The African Commission maintains its 
position on the derogation clause when they asserted that the restriction of human rights is 
not a solution to national difficulties; that the legitimate exercise of human rights does not 
pose dangers to a democratic State governed by the rule of law. 158 This constitutes a for-
midable weakness which can gravely undermine human rights promotion. 159 It would thus 
be appropriate to assume that, in order for fundamental human rights and the integrity of 
the law can be protected, is for the African Charter to establish a derogation clause. 
This Chapter showcased the reality that most state parties to the African Charter are also 
parties to the ICCPR, which contains explicit provisions concerning derogation. The dif-
154 Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, ACmHPR, para. 67. 
155 Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v .Nigeria, ACmHPR, para. 66. 
156 General Sanni Abacha and others v ChiefGani Fawehinmi, (2000) 6 NWLR as cited in Institute for 
International and Comparative Law in Africa (ICLA) Nigeria, undated, 13 . 
157 Heyns C, 'The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?' , 162. 
153 Amnesty International, Comite Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Association of 
Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v. Sudan ACmHPR Comm. 48/90, 50/91 , 52/91 , 
89/93 , 13th Annual Activity Report (1999), 79. 
159 Dada JA, 'Impediments to human rights protection in Nigeria' , 70. 
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ferent legal requirements that are provided for by the treaties creates a lacuna as to which 
treaty a contracting party to both, is expected to adhere to. Should the African Charter's 
provisions be undermined to prioritise the ICCPR, when African States are faced with 
states of emergencies? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IMPLICATIONS OF ESTABLISHING A DEROGATION CLAUSE IN 
THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
4.0 Introduction 
With Chapter three's expository analysis of some African constitutions with derogation 
provisions, one may ask then why the Charter does not reflect this constitutional practice. 
This Chapter not only analyses the possible reasons for the lack of the inclusion of the 
clause, but the arguments that are for and against its incorporation in the African Charter. 
4.1 Plausible reasons for the omission of the derogation clause 
4.1.1 The Charter was drafted in a hurry 
Some aspects of the African Charter were drafted during the meeting of African experts 
and jurists in Dakar, Senegal, from 28 November to 8 December 1979. As a result of the 
Cold War atmosphere, different political or ideological issues managed to extend to Afri-
can states . Countries such as the Gambia, Senegal and Botswana retained liberal, pluralist 
political systems whereas African Socialism was present with other states .160 This conflict 
of schools of thought and ideologies is said to have haunted the drafting of the Charter 
and at times even threatened the integrity and survival of the process. 161 Lengthy debates 
hence slowed drafting, precipitating the finalisation of only eleven articles. 162 
Because of the aforementioned, political pressure was exerted by the OAU's Council of 
Ministers, following the conclusion of the Dakar Conference. They requested that the 
Ministerial Conference reconvene in Banjul, Gambia, 'as soon as possible' to finish the 
Charter, 163 and urged to 'exert efforts to complete its work' .164 Conclusively, the drafting 
of the African Charter took nearly two years to complete. During the Banjul Conference 
of 7th to 19th January 1981, 68 articles were adopted, well before the set date of comple-
160 Jallow H, The la w of the Aji-ican (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 27. 
16 1 Jallow H, The la w of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 27. 
162 Viljoen F, International human rights law in Aji-ica , 160. 
163 Gittleman R, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights : A legal analysis' 22 Virginia Journal 
of International Law ( 1982), 667. 
164 Viljoen F, International human rights law in Africa, 161. 
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tion, 165 whilst the Assembly of Head of States and Government (AHG) approved this 
draft with no debate, 166 review, amendments or even a formal vote. 167 Contradictorily, as 
stipulated in Chapter Two, the ICCPR took a drafting process of nearly twenty years to 
complete. As the case may be, further deliberations concerning the protection of human 
rights should have occurred, and this may have led to more room for the derogation pro-
vision to be discussed. 
4.1.2 Drafting a Charter that serves African needs 
Okoth Ogendo, contends that one of the reasons an African human rights mechanism was 
created, is because a system needed to be founded on historical traditions and values of 
African civilisations rather than reproducing and trying to administer the norms and prin-
ciples derived from the historical experiences of Europe and Americas . 168 
In 1969, the United Nations Division of Human Rights, in cooperation with the Govern-
ment of the United Arab Republic, organised a seminar in Cairo, to study the possibility 
of the establishment of regional commissions on human rights with special reference to 
Africa. During the seminar, Africans expressed their views that the UDHR was a docu-
ment adopted when most of the members of the United Nations were States with 'white 
populations, largely European and of Christian traditions '. 169 The general stance was that 
the principles expressed therein did not necessarily reflect African values or problems 
embodied in peculiarly African solutions. 170 
It is therefore no surprise that the experts meeting in Dakar in 1979, would reject the sub-
stantive provisions of the United Nations-sponsored Monrovia Proposal (of 1979 held in 
Liberia) so as to attempt to create a uniquely African document more responsive to Afri-
165 Murray R, Evans M, Th e African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights: Th e system in practice 1986-
2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, 7. 
166 Viljoen F, International human rights law in Africa , 161. 
167 Jallow H, The law of the Aji-ican (Banjul) Charter on Human and People 's Rights, 34. 
168 Nmehielle V, The African human rights system, 83. 
169 Gittleman R, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ' , 671 . 
170 Gittleman R, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights', 671. 
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can needs. 171 In the opinion of the experts assembled at Dakar, problems unique to Africa 
justified a departure from such regional models such as the ECHR and the ACHR. 172 It 
was made clear on 8th December 1979, that whatever the final draft may be, it would be 
crucial not to present the OAU with a carbon copy of other international instruments, 
which because of their universality, did not specifically focus on African concerns and 
traditional values. 173 The experts were however mindful in avoiding derogations, from 
principles of human rights which had at the time been universally accepted. 174 
4.1.3 African States were not willing to sign the Charter 
The experts are said to have been realistic about the extent to which the sovereignty of 
states could be curtailed despite the mandate granted by the AHG of the OAU. 175 Having 
the derogation clause could have thus driven states away, from approving the African 
Charter. 176 
4.2 Arguments for the inclusion of a derogation clause 
4.2.1 The advantages of derogation provisions 
Advocates for the inclusion of a derogation clause in the African Charter compel us to 
consider the reason that derogation clauses exist. The derogation regime seeks to strike a 
delicate balance between the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals 
(when his fundamental rights would be most at risk) along with protecting the legitimate 
interests of a nation in a situation of crisis by placing reasonable restraint of emergency 
powers of a state. 177 As Melkamu states, such a provision, although an additional source 
of power to the government, is a significant limitation to governmental power for it cur-
171 Gittleman R, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ', 671. 
172 Gittleman R, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights', 668. 
173 Jallow H, The law of the Aji·ican (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 31. 
174 Jallow H, The law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 32. 
175 Jail ow H, The law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 33. 
176 Jallow H, The law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, 32. 
177 Loof JP, ' Crisis situations, counter terrorism and derogation from the European Convention on Human 
Rights ', 37. 
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tails the power of government in situations where protection of individual rights are most 
needed. 178 
Derogation clauses reduce uncertainty by authorising temporary deviations from treaty 
rules if exigent circumstances arise. 179 The reality that the African Charter does not con-
tain a derogation clause is said to be regrettable since for the past two decades, the Afri-
can continent has faced frequent situations of war and emergency; 180 videlicet, Gambia, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia as is stipulated in Chapter 3. Derogation clauses further promote the 
protection of human rights through their inclusion of non-derogable rights. The gravest of 
emergencies cannot justify the breach of non-derogable rights, for they are considered to 
be too fundamental and too precious to be dispensed with.181 As shown in Chapter 3, the 
various African states provided for non-derogable rights in their respective constitutions. 
The latter provisions, as seen, were either vague or limited. The inclusion of a derogation 
clause in the African Charter would serve to bring uniformity to the protection of non-
derogable rights as is recognised in the ICCPR, ACHR and the ECHR. 
4.2.2 The disadvantages of derogation provisions 
The absence of the derogation clause garners critique; one being that its omission weak-
ens the entire system of the African Charter, as states facing an emergency are unlikely to 
seek the guidance of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights if they 
know that the Commission cannot recognise and accommodate their need to enter into a 
state of exception. 182 
178 Melkamu T A, 'Absence of a derogation clause under the African Charter and the position of the 
African Commission' 4 Bahir Dar University Journal of Law (20 14), 265 . 
179 Hafner-Burton E, Helfer L, Fariss C· ' Emergency and escape: Explaining derogations from human rights 
treaties ', 55 . 
180 RM, D'Sa, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' , 109. 
181 Michaelsen C, 'Derogating from international human rights obligations in the ' war against terrorism '? A 
British-Australian perspective' Terrorism and Political Violence Journal (2005), 8. 
182Cowell F, 'Sovereignty and the question of derogation' 139. 
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Additionally, instead of the Charter taking primacy, the various national laws of member 
states actually assume primary place, consequentially creating legal spaces that are no-
tionally outside of the Commission's scope of review. 183 The Algerian Charter for Peace 
and National Reconciliation prohibits public debate regarding the atrocities committed 
during the past decade of internal conflict. The prerogative that the absence of the deroga-
tion clause gives to state parties, is dangerous. It allows for some level of discretionary 
power, which can be seen with the 1992 Gambian state report to the African Commission; 
indicated in its Chapter 3 of the 1970 Gambian Constitution were the rights in the Char-
ter. After the coup, the new government suspended chapter 3 which contained the funda-
mental Bill of right's provisions. 184 
As Melkamu states, the maintenance of an absence of a derogation clause should not be 
based on the theoretical assumption that its omission reduces the power of states to re-
strict human and peoples' rights and ensures the better protection of such rights. 185 As 
suggested in Chapter 3, African constitutions contain emergency clauses within their pro-
visions, pertaining to public emergencies. Not only does the Charter not reflect an African 
constitutional standard, but it also presents a dilemma to parties states who are signatories 
to the ICCPR, that in fact contains a derogation clause. The general inconsistencies pre-
sents confusion on the nature of obligations of states for there is no rule of international 
law that could govern the hierarchy between human right treaties. 186 Critics of the Charter 
go as far as recommending parties to ignore the Charter in times of public and state emer-
gencies.187 
It is of no consolation that the derogation regime can also be considered as rules of inter-
national customary law, significantly so, for even non-signatory parties to treaties are also 
183 Cowell F, 'Sovereignty and the question of derogation ' 154-155. 
184 Ouguergouz F, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. A comprehensive agenda for hu-
man dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa, 426. 
185 Melkamu TA, 'Absence of a derogation clause under the African Charter and the position of the 
African Commission', 262 . 
186 Melkamu TA, 'Absence of a derogation clause under the African Charter and the position of the 
African Commission' , 267. 
187 Heyns C, 'The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?' , 162. 
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bound by these standards, 188 treaties such as the VCLT. The United Nations Sub-
Commission on Human Rights, echoed the importance of adopting derogation clauses. 189 
They encourage all states whose legislation contains no explicit clause that guarantees the 
legality of the implementation of a state of emergency, to adopt clauses in accordance 
with international norms and principles. 19° Keeping in mind the aforementioned interna-
tional and national incorporation of derogation clauses, the treaty seems dangerously in-
adequate. 
4.3 Arguments against the inclusion of a derogation clause 
From Heyns to Serrnet, whose criticisms are highlighted in Chapter One, various scholars 
have criticised the absence of the derogation clause. They, however tend to ignore the 
several factors that may justify its absence. 
Abdi Jibril Ali, specifies such justifications to include the increase of non-derogable 
rights in the international community. He argues that since the adoption of the UDHR, the 
promotion and protection of human rights are on an upward trajectory as evidenced by the 
adoption of several global and regional human rights instruments and the establishment of 
organs that monitor their irnplernentation. 191 From the corning into force of the ECHR of 
1953 (that provides for four non-derogable rights) to the ICCPR of 1976 with six non-
derogable rights; increasingly to the ACHR of 1978, that contains five more non-
derogable rights than the ICCPR as was illustrated in Chapter Two of this thesis. It could 
thus be argued that the absence of the derogation is a commendable reflection of the trend 
of expanding non-derogable rights. Moreover, other human rights instruments such as the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) and even the 
UDHR do not provide for derogation provisions. 
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Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 2, during the drafting of the derogation clause for 
the ECHR, the British government was insistent on the inclusion of derogation articles 
and exemption clauses; whereas some States protested against the insertion of the 
clause. 192 Ali argues that the derogation clause was initially incorporated as an instrument 
of colonial control. 193 It would assume that both derogation clauses (ICCPR and ECHR) 
as was encouraged by Britain, were responding to the 'increase in resistance to British 
rule from subjugated populations' in Africa and Asia. 194 For instance, Britain exercised 
extensive use of colonial states emergency powers and provisions to repress independ-
ence movements, against the Man Man of Kenya and declared an eight year state of 
emergency in the period prior to independence. 195 
Derogations are essentially designed to deal with public emergencies. A concept, that is 
prone to manipulation, especially by African States. Several states have fail ed to notify 
the ICCPR of their intention to derogate whilst declaring states of emergencies. 196 By way 
of illustration, states of emergencies have been declared in Nigeria 1998, Sierra Leone 
1998 and 2008, Egypt's three decade long state of emergency (with a three month exten-
sion as of January 12 2018)197 Ethiopia 1998,2016 and 2018. 
The exercise of the derogation system is extremely flawed. The current system under the 
ICCPR and the ECHR creates a 'legal grey hole ' ; a legal space wherein, some legal con-
straints on executive action exist, but that are so insubstantial that they still permit the 
192 Hartman J, 'Derogation from human rights treati es in public emergencies' , 5. 
193 Ali A, ' Derogation from constitutional ri ghts and its implication under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples ' Rights' , 90. 
194 Reynolds J 'The Long Shadow of Colonialism: The Origins of the Doctrine of Emergency in Interna-
ti onal Human Ri ghts Law' Comparative Research in Law & Politica l Economy. Research Paper Number 19 
of 20 I 0, 38 - h p: //digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/86 on 22 January 2018. 
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h ttps : I /www. reuters. com/ arti c I e/ns-e gyp t -security/egypt-to-ex tend-s tate-o f- emergency-for-3-m on th s-m en a-
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government to do as it pleases. 198 For instance, the ECHR allows for very lengthy deroga-
tion periods. 199 For instance, Turkey has given the most far-reaching notices of deroga-
tion. They span the years 1961, 1963-1964, 1970-1975,200 and as recent as August of 
2016 where UN experts urged Turkey to adhere to its human rights obligations even in 
time of declared emergency which Turkey declared in July of 2016.201 The reasons given 
for assuming derogation have been critiqued for not being compelling enough whilst the 
extent ofthe derogation is unspecified. 202 Additionally, the United Kingdom's declared a 
state of emergency after the 9111 attacks on US soil. 203 The rationale that the life of ana-
tion was at stake, in the United Kingdom's scenario can be viewed as hyperbolic, hence 
allowing states to some form of discretion as what constitutes issues threatening the na-
tion. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This section has examined the appropriateness of the derogation clause in the African 
context. The doctrine is justified through its system of protecting human rights whilst cur-
tailing governmental power. Although its advantages are apparent, one cannot ignore the 
arguments opining for its omission within the African context. Through this Chapter, it is 
apparent that the desirability of derogations provisions is necessary in the context of the 
African Charter. 
198Dyzenhaus D, 'Schmitt v Dicey: Are state of emergency inside or outside the legal order,' 27(5) Cardozo 
Law Review (2006), 2018 . 
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201 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'UN experts urge Tur-
key to adhere to its human rights obligations even in time of declared emergency' 19 August 2016 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=20394> on 18 January 2018. 
202 Cowell F, 'Sovereignty and the question of derogation' , 149. 
203 A. and others v United Kingdom, ECtHR Judgment of 19 February 2009. 
39 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Despite the overall international acclaim that heralded the adoption of the African Charter 
in 1981, and its subsequent entry into force in 1986, calls for reform of the African human 
rights mechanism began within five years of its existence.204 The problem identified by 
this dissertation was that derogation provisions help in the promotion and protection in 
human rights, an international customary norm that is not in practice under the African 
Charter; and yet as the previous chapter stipulated, the practice of derogation clauses does 
have its limitations and disadvantages. Nevertheless, the existence of what amount to par-
allel legal universes within African countries is certainly not easy to square with the no-
tion of equality before the law. Yet such squaring should be done, in the overriding inter-
est of ensuring that the Banjul Charter norms are able to function meaningfully in the cur-
rent African social framework.205 
5.2 Conclusion to this study 
This thesis began with the assumption that a derogation clause is pertinent to the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights in Africa. However, in reviewing the disadvantages 
stipulated in the previous chapter, incorporating the derogation provision into the Charter 
will require a more precise and complicated strategy, to avoid its undoing. 
5.2.1 Recap of chapter one 
Chapter one set out to introduce the research. It briefly discusses the arguments for and 
against the derogation clause as well as identifying a theoretical justification for a deroga-
tion provision that caters to the division. The study also set out to investigate the suitabil-
ity ofthe derogation clause in the African Charter. 
5.2.2 Recap of chapter two 
204 Nmehielle V, The African human rights system, 243. 
205 Melkamu T A, 'Absence of a derogation clause under the African Charter and the position of the 
African Commission', 262. 
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Chapter two aimed at highlighting the divergent avenues that different international hu-
man rights instruments sought to come to the conclusion of a derogation clause within 
their respective treaties. It displayed the reality that contracting parties to the ICCPR and 
ECHR did not always approve of the inclusion of the derogation clause; a fact that this 
research, presupposed (a presumption that was based on the universality and acceptance 
of the derogation clause within the various international human rights instruments) . 
From the analysis of the chapter, it was compelling to see the historical nature of the ac-
ceptance and disapproval of this derogation doctrine. Although member states of the IC-
CPR and the ECHR were suspicious of a derogation doctrine during early stages of their 
respective drafting process, it is not lost that they both ended up including derogation 
provisions in their treaties; hence the desirability of derogation. 
5.2.3 Recap of chapter three 
This Chapter proved the disadvantages of the lack of a derogation regime in the African 
Charter, due to its incorporation in its Member states' constitutions. This Chapter some-
what discredits the African cultural theory that states of the distinctive rights that are only 
contextual in Africa. It does so by highlighting that an international custom, in form of a 
derogation provision, are rampant in some African states through their constitutions 
5.2.4 Recap of chapter four 
The Chapter examined the suitability of the derogation clause in the African Charter. It 
concluded that the derogation regime has indeed its flaws. Although this may be the case, 
the overriding interest of the Charter to protect and promote human rights should prevail 
through the inclusion of a derogation provision. 
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 Commission extending its powers of interpretation 
The African Commission has wide powers to interpret the Banjul Charter in a progressive 
manner. So as to ensure the better protection of human and people's rights, the Commis-
sion may interpret the African Charter in a manner that is consistent with not only inter-
national standards, but more specifically to the catering of African needs and values. 
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5.3.2 Additional protocols of the African Charter that include derogation provisions 
As was discussed in the African Commission's 19th session, there is general dissatisfac-
tion expressed with the Charter. 206 Additional protocols may establish guidelines that 
State parties may use to derogate in an effective and uniform manner. Provisions detailing 
a states powers, limitations, duration, notification, restrictions should be encouraged. 
Scholar Schreur advocates for the following to be considered whilst formulating a deroga-
tion clause207 
1. Reasonable accommodation between the necessities of community interests and justi-
fied particular individual interests. 
2. Derogations must be accompanied by official proclamations and notifications giving all 
relevant details. 
3. Derogations must be subject to effective outside supervision in order to prevent abuse. 
4. Derogations must be used only in situations of absolute necessity in which other means 
cannot reasonably be expected to safeguard public order. 
5. Derogations must be applied subject to strict proportionality. This means: (1) that the 
derogation should only apply to those rights which have to be limited to cope with the 
emergency; and (b) that the limitation should only apply to the extent absolutely required. 
6. Derogations should be withdrawn as soon as circumstances permit. 
5.4 Further research 
More research as to the viability of a derogation clause is needed. Each regional and in-
ternational convention has established a derogation provision that caters to its member 
states. Since the omission of the derogation clause can be traced to the need to preserve 
African values and traditions, a derogation clause, which is clearly desirable in the Afri-
can Charter context, should reflect the latter. 
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